ACM Interactions

Authors:
Ali Alkhatib

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Recently, Apple and Google discussed developing and distributing a digital contact tracing system that will inform people when they've been exposed to someone who's contracted Covid-19, and communicate to people that they've been exposed to you if you later test positive yourself. Apple has since deployed a beta of iOS 13 with the first parts of this system exposed to developers and users. At the time of this writing in late April and early May, we're desperate for information and weary from not knowing who's caught Covid-19, who's still vulnerable, who gets it worse and why, or even how to treat it. We're desperate for any information we can get our hands on. This proposal by Apple and Google promises some information that we can finally dig into. Unfortunately, this system of digital tracing isn't going to work, and we need to stop the plan before it gets off the ground.

I have written about "digital forests" (https://ali-alkhatib.com/blog/digital-forests) and the harmful downstream effects of simplifying and reducing how we track and measure our messy world (and earlier this year gave a working talk about it). I wrote about how we develop models to describe the world—and our lives within it—that are necessarily but also dangerously reductive. In his book Seeing Like a State, James Scott writes about foresting in Europe, the Great Leap Forward, and other case studies of centralizing ideologies that ignore or trample on the delicate balances of our social and natural ecologies [1]. During the Industrial Revolution, it was difficult to reason about air pollution so we wrote it off entirely; decades later, that came to haunt us in the form of acid rain and widespread deteriorating public health.

Digital contact tracing has all the hallmark characteristics of these case studies. If we're not careful, we're going to adopt these systems, and the facile, naive models of the world that these systems create will give us a dangerously incomplete picture of the world. Worse, if these systems become the principal drivers of our policies, we'll go from looking at an incomplete map of the world to navigating with one.

The schemes we're reading about—some from joint partnerships such as Apple and Google; others unilaterally presented by surveillance startups such as Palantir and Clearview AI—all offer their own flavors of omnipresent surveillance and differ in bits and pieces. I'm going to focus on the only credible proposal—the one Apple and Google have floated—because I hardly even know where to start with the other proposals. Suffice it to say that we shouldn't take Palantir's offer to surveil us even more than they already do. As for Clearview, they scraped all of our images without our consent and subsequently endured numerous embarrassing data breaches.

Let's talk about what digital contact tracing generally entails by using Apple and Google's system as a model case. If you know what their proposal entails, feel free to skip ahead to the next section. But chances are that something has changed in the time since I started writing this article, so if for no other reason than a clear timeline, you should probably at least skim for a sense of where things stood when I was writing.

  What This Scheme Will Do (More or Less, As of May 2020)

The simplest, most direct way to implement digital contact tracing would be to track where you are at any given moment. If you spend 20 minutes at a coffee shop, somewhere there will be a record that you were at Starbucks from 12:00 P.M. to 12:20 P.M. Somewhere, theoretically, there would be records for everyone participating in this scheme, such that if someone wanted to ask the system "Who was at Starbucks at 12:10 P.M.?" a list would come back with your name on it. To be honest, Google probably already has the means to produce a list like this from Google Maps. You can even request a record of all the places Google Maps knows you've been over a certain timeline.

Instead of recording where you are the way Google Maps does or other location-tracking apps you're familiar with, under this scheme your phone records whom you're near. To illustrate what this means, let's walk through an example.

Under this program, your phone would send out a signal every 5 minutes with a unique word. So from 12 P.M. to 1 P.M., your phone would send out messages like this:

12:00: Apple
12:05: Banana
12:10: Orange
12:15: Kiwi
12:20: Potato
12:25: Cherry
12:30: Tomato
12:35: Pear
12:40: Coconut
12:45: Orange
12:50: Peach
12:55: Eggplant
13:00: Kumquat

In this system, no other phone is sending out these exact words; if anyone ever hears Kumquat, it's because their phone was near your phone at 1 P.M. If my phone has Kumquat in its archive, it means that I was near you at 1 P.M.

Let's say I was in line behind you at a coffee shop for 10 minutes from 12:12 to 12:22. Since I'd be close to you, I'd get the messages Kiwi (at 12:15) and Potato (at 12:20), and my phone would hold on to that. I don't get your name, number, or any other information about you—just the two words. We're each just sending out unique words every five minutes and keeping track of what we happen to hear from all the things around us. This app isn't keeping track of who we are, or where we are, just what words it's hearing.

Now let's say that you feel sick at 1 P.M., so you go to the doctor and a PCR test comes back positive for Covid-19. You'll go into your phone and say "I just tested positive for Covid-19" and your phone will send the last several days' worth of words to some database. Something like {Apple, Banana, Orange, Kiwi, Potato, Cherry, Tomato, Pear, Coconut, Orange, Peach, Eggplant, Kumquat}, but spanning several days or weeks, so we're talking about thousands of these words.

When my phone checks in with the database and downloads all the new words it has, it'll check and find that I had heard "Apple, Banana," which means I must have been near enough for our phones to chat for something like 10 minutes. Is 10 minutes a big deal? No, not really. But what if I had heard all of the words above except for Apple and Banana? That would mean that from 12:10 P.M. to 1 P.M. I was close enough to you that our phones were talking. The 10-minute example is something like standing behind someone in line at a coffee shop. The 50-minute example is more like having lunch at the table next to you at a restaurant.

Let's change the scenario from coffee shops and restaurants to something more sensitive: Let's say both of us were at an STD clinic at the same time for 45 minutes. What's relevant is that we were someplace together at the same time, not where that place was. This approach promises to give us the someplace together answer without revealing the STD clinic detail. All anyone knows is that you sent out a bunch of words, and I heard the words that put us in the same place for about 45 minutes. Where exactly were you when you sent Tomato? Doesn't matter. What was I doing when I received Eggplant? Don't worry about it.

Designing a system that goes out of its way like this to avoid knowing the literal location you're at wasn't the simplest approach, and it's at least a little praiseworthy that this system is being developed in a slightly complicated and confusing way with the right goal in mind. If you look at Strava or Snapchat or some other location-tracking app, you can always see yourself as a dot on a map, moving around perhaps with other dots on the same map; this throws out that entire approach. In the context of Covid-19, all anyone really needs to know is that we were near each other. This approach strives to give us that and nothing else.

I think it's important that we understand what this system does so we can talk meaningfully about what it doesn't achieve, and what it doesn't even bother trying to do. Which is a lot.

  Welcome Back

We're gearing up to sacrifice substantial amounts of our privacy and anonymity in the world in exchange for a woefully dubious solution to our uncertainty. To quote Arundhati Roy, "If we were sleepwalking into a surveillance state, now we are running toward it because of the fear that is being cultivated" [2]. Let's talk about why: First, this system isn't going to give us a better sense of the world in the most crucial places; second, this system is going to undermine our privacy and dignity in ways that we can only begin to imagine right now.

Let's start with why this system won't work.

Digital contact tracing will exclude the poor, children, and myriad other uncounted groups. In the description I made earlier, I pointed out that Apple and Google's plan calls for some sort of proximity detection, probably involving Bluetooth and some of the fancier, newer technology that your smartphone may have if it was introduced in the past few years. Some of the technical requirements of this system preclude older devices from working, meaning the people with older smartphones won't be able to benefit from alerts to this system unless they upgrade to newer phones—something they almost certainly can't afford to do, nor should they be obligated to in order to receive necessary information about risk exposure. Ars Technica recently published a report that several billion smartphones don't have the technology necessary to participate in the proximal location-sensing scheme that Apple and Google are discussing [3]:

The particular kind of Bluetooth "low energy" chips that are used to detect proximity between devices without running down the phone's battery are absent from a quarter of smartphones in active use globally today, according to analysts at Counterpoint Research. A further 1.5 billion people still use basic or "feature" phones that do not run iOS or Android at all..."[M]ost of these users with the incompatible devices hail from the lower-income segment or from the senior segment which actually are more vulnerable to the virus" [3].

Every day we get more data showing that communities that have historically been excluded or deliberately untreated by our healthcare infrastructure are particularly vulnerable, both in contracting Covid-19 and in mortality. As Gina Neff has written, the locations linked to new Covid-19 cases are prisons, food-processing facilities (specifically meatpacking), and nursing homes [4]. These are settings in which people are under immense pressure to take whatever work they can find, including high-risk essential work like logistics for Amazon in their obscenely dangerous warehouses [5], or delivering food and groceries to us despite receiving basically or literally no functional personal protective equipment, putting them in direct contact with potentially hundreds of people every day.

The lines don't divide just along class; digital contact tracing omits children, substantially problematizing the picture we get as soon as families are involved. These aren't minor issues; they're major gaps that will lead to systematically and unaccountably poor data. The spaces and the people we should be most concerned for, and paying the most attention to, won't show up in a digital contact tracing system like any of the ones proposed so far.

Digital contact tracing staggeringly misses the point of care that we should be most concerned with.

This system's exclusions will decisively undermine its accuracy and endanger everyone. The risks of acting on bad data—the result of excluding the poor, children, and other high-risk groups—are unspeakably high. This is different from working with a small sample size or even from working with no data. Building a dataset that excludes entire categories of people—as we're beginning to do with Native American Covid-19 patients [6]—skews our vision of the world in ways we won't be able to account for, and with confidence that's unearned, ultimately steamrolling the groups that we leave out. This is why the CDC employs "sentinel surveillance" to track the flu—because acting only on the data we get from people who are wealthy enough to go to a doctor for the flu would give them a dangerously misleading picture of its spread every year [7]. Everyone needs access to the same level of care, with no omissions, or we risk lulling ourselves into oblivious complacence while this virus and others like it sweep through our communities.

We should care that the gaps in our knowledge will be consequential and non-random, sabotaging our efforts to understand what's actually going on in the world and undermining our response.

Proximity is a dangerously simplistic way to model Covid transmission. There are issues inherent to proximity-based contact tracing that have nothing to do with access to the technology, as well. Recent studies have shown that people don't need to be in proximity to someone with Covid-19 to catch it—they can just be downwind of that person [8]. It's not just that people's access to technology is messy and more complicated than people living in Silicon Valley tend to think (as evidenced by the push for bandwidth and device-intensive education tech); it's that the world doesn't model particularly easily, and certainly doesn't fit the bubble of what's within range of a Bluetooth module on your smartphone.

I wrote about this in my paper on "street-level algorithms" at CHI in 2019. People are constantly finding new ways to exist and make their ways through the world, so algorithmic systems that try to model our behavior and interactions will always be a step behind [9]. We'll have to constantly follow up on the errors these systems make, struggling to fix the damage they do in their false positives and false negatives, all in this hopeless chase to automate what essentially needs humans.

Digital contact tracing systems that render the world as normally distributed space with spheres of influence and contact characterized by radio waves will consistently leave us with dangerously wrong pictures of our exposure.

Proximal tracing doesn't maintain privacy the way advocates seem to think it does. We also need to talk about what proximal contact tracing offers and what it doesn't, especially since we're adopting this contrived system to avoid absolute locations. I said earlier how absolute location tracking might say that we were both at some GPS coordinates. Or it might offer a street address. In either case, it would reveal that we were both at some semantically meaningful place from 8 P.M. to 10 P.M., which could potentially be embarrassing or even damaging. Proximal tracking promises instead to reveal only that we were together between 8 P.M. and 10 P.M.

The problem is that neither of these approaches is particularly helpful to me when I'm trying to maintain privacy about where I meaningfully am. While there are unique risks associated with my absolute location being revealed (for instance, revealing where I live by showing where I tend to be every night), a revelation that I was among many people who are under investigation or otherwise suspected of some socially improper behavior is potentially just as damning as a record that puts us all at the same mailing address for that time—like if all of us have Kumquat on our phones.

The details of whether this data is held in centralized or decentralized locations doesn't matter much if the notification that I've been exposed to Covid-19 forces me to surface to seek care, revealing my association with that group.

Proximal location tracking has already recently been used to out dozens, perhaps hundreds, of gay men in Morocco [10]. It didn't help that their exact locations were obscured; they were "nearby." They were outed by their associations, not by their coordinates. And credible fears about whether law enforcement organizations will exploit these systems to harm vulnerable groups have proven difficult to squash, particularly with misleading and confusing statements by government officials [11].

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There are so many issues of uncertainty that digital contact tracing introduces, and so many gaps in whom it protects, that we need to reject it now before it gets off the ground.

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This isn't to say that absolute location tracking is the right approach, or that proximal tracking is a misstep, but that this distinction misses the point and fails to address the concern: We need laws that guarantee against the use of any data we collect for anything other than the confidential care of Covid-19. And we need to earn the trust of people giving us that data—something Clearview, Palantir, and arguably tech companies in general are inherently incapable of doing, given their business models of advertising and data mining that motivate their very existence.

We need real guarantees of protection against the use of this data for any purpose beyond the containment of Covid-19, and we need to commit to those principles.

  These are Just the Beginning of the Issues

The decisions we make now are going to dog us for generations. It's important that we move quickly, but it's just as important that we don't run headfirst into a surveillance state that offers nothing but oppression and more uncertainty.

I spent five years at Stanford studying computer science and noticed an insight among tech folks that I hadn't observed as much elsewhere. It was that if you have a complex mathematical problem that you can restate as another problem, or as a collection of other problems, then you might find down the road you can solve one of those problems and dramatically simplify the original task. Suddenly something that takes hundreds or thousands of hours to compute can be done virtually instantly.

I saw this kind of thinking applied to social problems all the time. Social problems are sticky and entangled and don't seem to reduce very well. But if you can perform a kind of problem-space arbitrage and convert the social problem into a technical one, you might find an insight in mathematics or computation later on that collapses the problem into something more manageable, or even trivial. It's enticing.

It's also wrongheaded. It's unproductive because it doesn't solve either the old social problems or the new technical ones, and it's dangerous because it obscures the real problems that we need to address—the ones we all recognize and otherwise feel entitled to engage with as fellow humans.

There are technical problems that need to be solved in this pandemic, but this isn't one of them. There are so many issues of uncertainty that digital contact tracing introduces, and so many gaps in whom it protects, that we need to reject it now before it gets off the ground, before we get lured into a false sense of certainty that everyone is covered and protected when in reality all we're accomplishing is deepening an existing divide between the empowered, the wealthy, the influential... and the people holding all of them up.

We need certainties in our life. Systematizing contact tracing into a digital system won't give us what it claims to offer, nor will it give us certainty. If we need some certainties, here are a few:

• We need more personal protective equipment for everyone. If we want people working in warehouses, nursing homes, and meat-processing facilities, we need to give them the means to avoid infection.
• We need more tests. We need so many tests for so many people that the cost becomes zero and the hurdle disappears. Los Angeles recently announced that every resident will get free tests whether they get referred for a test or not. We need more of this.
• We need to train human contact tracers. Algorithms will never be able to adequately model the world we live in and construct, and will never be able to keep up with all the weird, quirky qualities of the spaces we build and occupy. This job calls for human intelligence.
• This is such a given that it's almost not worth saying, but we need to change our relationship with labor. A year ago, if someone at a coffee shop felt sick, they might not have bothered to see a doctor. They almost certainly would have tried to work through it (at least at first). I think we all appreciate now how dangerous that is, but the threat of crushing medical debt and homelessness coerces people into work. That culture of coercive labor needs to end, or the rest of our lives will be punctuated by pandemics fueled and ultimately spread by workers who were compelled to continue working

There's already so much we need to do, and so much that needs to change, for us to have anything resembling the lives we appreciated before this pandemic. We don't also need to build and subject ourselves to omnipresent digital surveillance via personal devices. We must reject digital contact tracing. We need to care for one another.

  Some Addenda

Here are some questions I've gotten while writing this article and some brief thoughts in response:

• What about DP3T? DP3T (Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing) suffers a lot of the issues raised above. It still essentially requires tech and will leave out the sites of superspreading (prisons, nursing homes, meat-processing facilities); it still mostly avoids the public health policy changes that need to happen; it still goes for proximity versus absolute location tracking, which I outlined earlier isn't addressing the problem. In the introductory paragraph of their README file, they describe the project as seeking to "provide a technological foundation to help slow the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus" [12]. Like I said before, we don't need to center technology in coming up with solutions, and in fact this will only deepen divides in care that are already staggering.

There's also a point to be made that technological foundation usually means something more like "the political decisions were baked into the code and you can't do anything about them unless you have a Github account and file an issue or make a pull request." But I'll leave that to people who aren't yet completely exhausted making this point.

• What about Taiwan and South Korea? They adopted digital contact tracing and it seems to have worked. There are a few issues to this: First, there were substantial issues with Taiwan's and South Korea's deployments of digital contact tracing, stemming from uncomfortable revelations about peoples' private lives [13,14]. Second, the way the U.S. has cleaved a boundary between wealthy and poor—informed by slavery and white supremacy and urbanization and housing policies—really complicates any effort to translate tech-centric policies and programs from other cultures.

It's also worth saying that in Taiwan and South Korea, people can go see a doctor without worrying about crushing medical debt. Paid sick leave is a guarantee. People use masks and when the government tells them what to do, they generally trust their political leadership not to be corrupt or incompetent. America enjoys almost none of these advantages. Digital contact tracing wasn't a silver bullet (even in the context that more people in Taiwan and South Korea have smartphones); it was one of many more decisive characteristics of their economies, politics, and cultures that made it possible for people to get tested when they needed to get tested, to stay home when they needed to stay home, and to listen to the local and national leaders who were themselves advised by credible medical and epidemiological experts.

  References

1. Scott, J.C. Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. Yale Univ. Press, 1998.

2. Roy, A. Author and activist Arundhati Roy on Covid-19 and the Indian response. France24. May 23, 2020; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSZ-PtlY4HE

3. Bradshaw, T. 2 billion phones cannot use Google and Apple contact-tracing tech. Ars Technica. Apr. 20, 2020; https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/04/2-billion-phones-cannot-use-google-and-apple-contract-tracing-tech/

4. Neff, G. To fight this pandemic we must use stories. Twitter. Apr. 30, 2020; https://twitter.com/ginasue/status/1255847973797462016

5. Press, A. Amazon workers say warehouse health precautions are insufficient. JewishCurrents. Apr. 28, 2020; https://jewishcurrents.org/amazon-workers-say-warehouse-health-precautions-are-insufficient/

6. Nagle, R. Native Americans being left out of US coronavirus data and labelled as 'other'. The Guardian. Apr. 24, 2020; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/24/us-native-americans-left-out-coronavirus-data

7. Roush, S. Chapter 19: Enhancing Surveillance. In CDC Manual for the Surveillance of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases. 2017; https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/surv-manual/chpt19-enhancing-surv.html

8. Lu, J. et al. COVID-19 outbreak associated with air conditioning in restaurant, Guangzhou, China, 2020. Emerging Infectious Diseases 26, 7 (2020).

9. Alkhatib, A. and Bernstein, M. Street-level algorithms: A theory at the gaps between policy and decisions. Proc. of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, New York, 2019, Article 530; https://doi.org/10.1145/3290605.3300760

10. Alami, A. Dozens of gay men are outed in Morocco as photos are spread online. New York Times. Apr. 26, 2020; https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/world/middleeast/gay-morocco-outing.html

11. Morrison, S. Minnesota law enforcement isn't 'contact tracing' protesters, despite an official's comment. Vox Recode. Jun. 1, 2020; https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/6/1/21277393/minnesota-protesters-contact-tracing-covid-19

12. @veale et al. Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing-readme. 2020; https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/1b49aef42ec6fb59f17929fec3b54ec88b636405/README.md

13. Kim, N. 'More scary than coronavirus': South Korea's health alerts expose private lives. The Guardian. Mar. 5, 2020; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/06/more-scary-than-coronavirus-south-koreas-health-alerts-expose-private-lives

14. Singer, N. and Sang-Hun, C. As coronavirus surveillance escalates, personal privacy plummets. New York Times. Mar. 23, 2020; https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html

  Author

Ali Alkhatib is a research fellow at the Center for Applied Data Ethics, an initiative of the Data Institute at the University of San Francisco. Originally trained in anthropology, he now mostly investigates how people relate to individual algorithmic systems and with algorithmically mediated social ecologies by adapting theoretical lenses and frameworks originating in the social sciences to understand these phenomena. [email protected]

 

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