Security- and privacy-related tools often feature graphical (or in some cases textual or audio) indicators designed to assist users in protecting their security or privacy. But a growing body of literature has found the effectiveness of many of these indicators to be rather disappointing. Security researchers often evaluate the effectiveness of systems by their ability to resist attack. They typically envision a threat model in which an attacker attempts to "fool the software" by disabling the security software, performing a malicious action in an undetectable manner, or deceiving the software into interpreting a malicious action as an innocuous one.…
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